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This paper uses student-level Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) data to analyze the
determinants of schooling quality for seven Eastern European transition countries by estimating educational
production functions. The results show substantial effects of student background on educational performance and a
much lower impact of resources and the institutional setting. Two different groups of countries emerge. For the ﬁrst
group that features high mean test scores and has progressed far in transition, large effects of family background on
student performance and a higher spread of test scores illustrate the similarity to Western European schooling systems,
the performance of which it surpasses. Schools of the second group produce instead a denser distribution of educational
achievement, characteristic of communist societies.
r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
JEL Classification: I21; P36
Keywords: Educational economics; Input–output analysis; Productivity1. Introduction
This paper analyzes and compares the production of
schooling quality in seven Eastern European transition
countries striving for EU accession. A main focus of the
progress in the transition countries is on reforms of
institutions and a changing structure of society. The
supposedly egalitarian societies in which mainly the
party rank deﬁned the social position are replaced by a
new social distinction based on occupation and income.
Education is the major vehicle through which thee front matter r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserve
onedurev.2004.08.010
ing author. Tel.: +49621 1235284;
35225.
ess: ammermuller@zew.de (A. Ammermu¨ller).societal changes take place. The function of education
shifts from keeping the social consensus of a classless
society to allocating its individual members to economic
roles and positions, allowing for greater differentiation
by increased educational choice (Heyneman, 1997). The
readiness for and speed of transition depends therefore
essentially on reforms in education, which prepare
people for their new roles in society. Reforms include
the decentralization of the educational system, which
might increase its effectiveness by increasing its respon-
siveness to market forces at the local and national level.
A greater choice of different types of institutions for
students and an increased inﬂuence of parents on their
children’s education might as well result in higher
effectiveness in the new economic terms (Heyneman,d.
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choice may also serve to convey the values of democracy
and the market system to the population (EBRD, 2000).
Furthermore, the market economies demand new
abilities of students, like managing skills and high
ﬂexibility that were not fostered under the communist
regime (Berryman, 2000). In the phase of transition,
where old practices become obsolete and new opportu-
nities arise quickly, allocative skills like the ability to take
appropriate decisions, which constitute an important
effect of schooling (Schultz, 1975), are rewarded greatly
and affect the income distribution. Consistent with this
reasoning, rates of return to education have been found
to increase during the transition from communism to a
market system (Newell & Reilly, 1999; Boeri & Terrell,
2002). For example, the returns to higher education more
than doubled over the past 10 years in the Czech
Republic, as did their spread across occupations (Klazar,
Sedmihradsky´ & Vancˇurova´, 2001). The quality and
variance of educational achievement may thus have an
even bigger impact on the societal structure in transition
countries than in advanced countries. When the Eastern
European countries gain access to the EU and the labor
markets become integrated in the coming years, they
need to compete with the Western European labor force.
A well-educated work force is hence imperative for a
successful integration.
The challenges are accompanied by new threats to the
formerly high-performing education systems. Due to
economic recessions in the early phase of transition, the
level of ﬁnance for schools is hard to maintain. This
problem relates particularly to the countries whose
setbacks in the ﬁrst years of transition were greater and
who continue to struggle in their reform progress.
The available resources, the institutional setting of
schools and especially their usage depict the quality of
the schooling systems. The main goal of this paper is to
examine the impact of these factors, as well as of student
characteristics and family backgrounds, on the perfor-
mance of individual students by estimating educational
production functions for seven Eastern European
countries. While the former factors are determined by
school policy, the latter display the ability of schools to
diminish the impact of the environment surrounding
students. By estimating production functions of many
Eastern European schooling systems for the ﬁrst time,
the paper intends to elaborate on the determinants of
schooling quality during the phase of transition. In
addition, it contributes to the widely discussed topic of
the effect of resources. We also compare the character-
istics and the results of the production functions for the
Eastern European schooling systems to those of a
sample of EU member countries.
Educational production functions relate an outcome
of education like educational achievement to various
inputs. In this study, standardized test scores from theThird International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS), which are comparable across countries, are
related to variables drawn from background question-
naires on student background, resources employed and
the institutional setting (cf. Wo¨Xmann, 2003). These
unique micro-level data on test scores and background
information are available on over 42,000 students in the
7th and 8th grade of the seven countries, who took the
math and science tests in 1994/95. As the only
measurable outcome taken into account is educational
achievement, the analysis is restricted to the cognitive
dimension of schooling. Other educational outcomes
like civic values conveyed to students have to be
neglected in the data analysis.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is that a distinction can
be made between two groups of accession countries with
respect to the characteristics of the schooling systems,
which constitute a decisive factor during the transition
process. One group has moved decisively towards the
features of Western European countries while the other
cannot display successful results of transition yet. The
more advanced group, consisting of the Czech and
Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia, outperforms
most EU countries and has many traits similar to the
Western schooling systems. The schooling systems of the
less advanced group, including Lithuania, Latvia and
Romania, still feature characteristics of communist
times. Further ﬁndings of the paper are the relative
importance of student background for explaining test
scores, the ambiguous impact of resources, and the
limited but existing role of the institutional setting in
understanding within-country variations in test scores.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
The second section describes the seven transition
economies and characterizes the development of their
schooling systems in the 1990s. This qualitative review
facilitates an assessment of the data and results and
elaborates on particular characteristics that are not
implied in the variables. The third section describes the
TIMS study, the data for the Eastern European
countries, and the model used for the estimation of the
production functions, including discussions of the
advantages and limitations of the cross-sectional data
and methods employed. The fourth section presents and
discusses the results for the Eastern European countries.
The ﬁfth section compares them to a sample of Western
European countries. Finally, the sixth section concludes
with a summary of the ﬁndings and an assessment of
their contribution and relevance in the context of
transition economies.2. Review of the schooling systems in Eastern Europe
Seven countries that belong to the group of transition
countries and are EU accession countries participated in
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 1
Transitional progress and education systems in the Eastern European countries
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Population in ‘000a 10,264 10,106 1930 5415 3611 2385 22,364
GDP/capita US$ 1994b 3977 4052 7231 2721 1143 1442 1323
GDP/capita US$ 2000b 4797 4552 9073 3556 3064 3019 1644
Estimated GDP level in 2000, 1989 ¼ 100b 98 104 114 103 65 64 77
Ed. exp. per student US$ in 1994c 671 840 1492 319 195 283 115
Student pop. in ‘000d 1146 1360 189 804 512 299 2461
Enrollment in 1994e 99.5% 99.1% 96.7% 97.0% 92.2% 89.0% 91.4%
No. of school types for lower secondaryf 2 2 1 4 5 1 1
Average attendance rate in pre-primaryf 86% 86% 59% 82% 40% 23% 65%
aMid 2001 estimates, CIA Factbook Country Proﬁles, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
bEBRD Transition Report 2001, Country Assessments and Table A3.1.
cTotal educational expenditure in 1994 US$ divided by population of age 3–24 in 1994, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1997 and
Berryman (2000).
dNo. of children of compulsory school age in 2000, Eurybase, http://www.eurydice.org.
eEnrollment rates for basic education, ages 6/7–14/15 in 1994, Berryman (2000), Table A6.
fSchool types in 1994, attendance rate age 3–5 for 2000. See Eurybase.
1For more detailed information on TIMSS, see the internet
homepage http://timss.bc.edu.
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European countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Roma-
nia, Slovakia and Slovenia and the Baltic States Latvia
and Lithuania. Table 1 presents information on the
transition progress and level of development for each
country. The ﬁgures on GDP indicate the exceptional
status of Slovenia, featuring almost twice the Czech and
Hungarian level of GDP per capita. Slovakia is slowly
catching up to the three frontrunners. The Baltic States
and Romania, the biggest country and laggard in recent
years, belong to the lowest developed countries of the
sample. According to the similarities in the countries’
development, which might also affect the transitional
states of the schooling systems, two groups of countries
are formed. The countries Czech Republic (CSK),
Hungary (HUN), Slovakia (SLV) and Slovenia (SVN)
will be referred to as the ﬁrst group from now on. The
second group comprises the remaining three countries
Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU) and Romania (ROM).
The grouping is also motivated later on based on the
results.
With the retreat of the communist ideology in Eastern
Europe in 1990, quick and fundamental reforms of the
educational systems followed. Administration of school-
ing was decentralized, leaving multiple authorities a say
on education, including parents and the church.
Additionally, national schools were established, espe-
cially in the Baltic States, to foster national culture and
language. Moreover, the heterogeneity of schools
increased, changing from a system of only one basic
school to more specialized institutions like the gymna-
zium or technical and vocational schools and leading as
well to the development of private schools (cf. Filer &
Mu¨nich, 2000). For lower secondary education, whereTIMSS took place, the choice of different types of
schools is limited to one form in Latvia, Romania and
Slovenia, two in the Czech Republic and Hungary, four
in Slovenia and ﬁve in Lithuania. Policies also aimed at
decentralization and more heterogeneity of the system
within the single school types, by setting up special
ability classes for both low- and high-performing
students.3. Data and regression technique
3.1. The TIMSS data
TIMSS was conducted in 1994/95 by the International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achieve-
ment. Over 40 countries worldwide participated in
TIMSS, making it the largest and most complex
achievement study ever conducted (Gonzalez & Smith,
1997). This paper considers only the sample Population
II with students from the middle school years. It
comprises students from two adjacent grades who have
the largest proportion of 13-year-old students. They
correspond to the 7th and 8th grade in lower secondary
schools in the seven countries considered here. For the
analysis of Eastern European countries, data for over
42,000 students from more than 1000 schools are
available.1
The students took standardized achievement tests in
both mathematics and science. The results were scaled
according to an international test score with a mean of
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addition, each student, his teacher and principal had to
complete a questionnaire giving background informa-
tion on students, the community, resources of the school
including teacher characteristics and the institutional
setting. All available data for an individual student were
merged in one database (Wo¨Xmann, 2003) together with
his sampling weight. Table A1 provides data on the
participation at student, class and school level and the
ratio of sampled students. Schools in geographically
remote regions, extremely small schools and schools for
students with special needs were excluded from the
study, as were disabled students in regular schools. This
might have led to a bias of the sampled students,
especially when many disordered but not disabled
students have been placed into special schools. However,
all other students could be sampled and the exclusion
rate was not to exceed 10%.
As the questionnaires handed to students and teachers
comprise a multitude of questions, the problem of
missing data is inevitable. In order to prevent a selection
bias by ignoring all observations with incomplete data
and to keep the sample size high, missing data are
imputed. A set of fundamental variables that are
available for the greatest part of the students is selected
among the explaining variables. In cases where these
variables are missing, the average at the lowest level
available is taken as an approximation, meaning ﬁrst the
class average, then school average or ﬁnally country
average. Each of the other explaining variables is then
regressed on this set of variables, and missing values in
these other variables are substituted by the predicted
values from this regression. In the case of qualitative
data, the prediction is conducted on the basis of probit
and ordered probit models.2 For the purposes of this
paper, the data imputation is conducted separately
within each country.3
The dataset that is built on TIMSS offers the unique
opportunity to analyze and compare the educational
systems in the seven transition countries. With the
exception of Hungary and Poland, the former commu-
nist countries have not previously participated in an
international cross-country study on student achieve-
ment. The dataset allows for the ﬁrst estimation of
educational production functions for this large group of
Eastern European countries. Moreover, the quality of
the available data with the immense background
information on various inputs and the quantity, with
data available for between 4976 and 7471 students in the
individual countries, allow for a very thorough analysis.
The sampling design to test two adjacent grades of each2For more details on the imputation method, see Wo¨Xmann
(2003).
3A table specifying the share of missing values for each
variable is available from the authors upon request.school also permits to estimate the between-grade
variation, as will be discussed later on in the identiﬁca-
tion strategy.
An obvious limitation of each cross-sectional study is
that data are only available for one point in time. It is
therefore impossible to control for prior educational
achievement and to consider the value added of a school
year to students separately. Instead, the data compare
the level of student achievement. Further possible
limitations are missing variables for state or regional
factors. Omitting them in the regressions might lead to a
bias of coefﬁcients. Aggregation of data above the state
level is likely to exacerbate this problem (Hanushek,
Rivkin, & Taylor, 1996), which does not apply to the
micro-level database used here, though.
3.2. Description of country data
This section sketches the different schooling systems
by considering the most noticeable mean values of the
explanatory variables given in the data and used in the
estimated models. The deﬁnitions and ranges of value of
all 25 variables are given in Table A2, while Table A3
displays their mean values and standard deviations.
A distinction between the two groups is evident in the
mean test scores that the students achieved in TIMSS.
The four countries of the ﬁrst group all reach mean
scores in both math and science that lie above the
international mean of 500. They even accomplish higher
scores than most Western European nations, including
Denmark, France and Germany. Czech students per-
formed best among the participating transition coun-
tries, with average scores of 544 in math and 553 in
science. The countries of the second group instead all
scored below the international mean of 500, with
Lithuania being the worst performer with 454 points
in math, superior only to Portugal in Europe. The
spread of the test scores is lowest in the low-scoring
Baltic States and highest for the Czech Republic,
Hungary and also for Romania.
Overall, the parents of the tested students are well-
educated, with the minor exception of Romania. The
average class size varies within the two groups of
transition countries, being lowest in the Baltic States
with around 22 students per class and highest in
Slovakia and Romania with an average class size of
over 26. The share of female teachers is around 80% in
the transition countries.
The separation of the countries holds also for the
descriptive statistics of other variables. The second
group has a higher share of students from separated
families, of parents belonging to the lowest educational
group and a lower average education, except for
Lithuania. The second group suffers more from a
shortage of materials in schools and has fewer well-
educated teachers. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are
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value-added model, where we use the mean 7th-grade score in
the respective school as a proxy for the lagged performance of
the 8th-grade students in this school. In addition to several
obvious shortcomings of this approximation, the main problem
with this speciﬁcation is that it would only be appropriate if
A. Ammermu¨ller et al. / Economics of Education Review 24 (2005) 579–599 583instead well endowed with materials and a well-educated
teaching staff. The schooling systems are most decen-
tralized in Hungary and Slovenia and still very
centralized in Romania.
3.3. Regression models and techniques
3.3.1. The basic specification
To estimate educational production functions for the
individual countries at the student level, the following
general model will be employed:
Tics ¼ b0 þ Bicsb1 þ Rcsb2 þ Icsb3 þ ns þ ics, (1)
where T is the math or science test score of student i in
class c at school s, B is a set of background variables on
the student and her family, R are measures of resources
used and teacher characteristics, I is a set of variables
reﬂecting the institutional setting and n and e are error
terms at the school and student level, respectively.4
If the assumption held that any factors which are not
controlled for by the included explanatory variables and
which might therefore enter the error term are not
systematically related to the included explanatory
variables, least-squares estimation of model (1) would
yield estimates of the inﬂuence of the different explana-
tory variables on student performance. The speciﬁcation
measures effects on student performance in levels, rather
than in the value added to performance from 1 year to
the next. Given that background hardly changes over
time, it affects student performance over several years,
so that the relevant performance measure is indeed one
of levels rather than the value added in a single year.
Background can also be reasonably viewed as exogenous
to student performance (cf. Wo¨Xmann, 2003 for a more
detailed discussion).
Furthermore, because the basic school, which includes
grades 1–9, still attracts the majority of students in many
Eastern European countries, even many resource and
institutional features affect student performance over
several years. Also, as pointed out by Krueger (1999),
the effect of class size may exert itself mainly in the ﬁrst
year in which a student is placed in a smaller class, so
that value-added estimations in later years may miss the
main effect, while level estimations do not.5 On the other
hand, employing cross-sectional data is a clear limitation4The information on individual student test scores and
background variables provided by the TIMSS micro-level
database allows for a more precise estimation of coefﬁcients
and less bias than does aggregated data used for most
estimations (Card & Krueger, 1996). Although also using the
TIMSS database, Hanushek and Luque (2003) do not employ it
at the student level but aggregate it to the classroom level
instead.
5However, observational data on class sizes may be
endogenous to student performance, a point we discuss further
in Section 3.3.2.because it provides only imperfect measures of the
real inputs into the cumulative process of education
(Hanushek, 2003). Therefore, employing cross-sectional
data to estimate the level model (1) might limit
causal interpretation of the obtained estimates.6 Esti-
mates based on the speciﬁc model should rather be
interpreted cautiously in terms of descriptive conditional
correlations.
The survey design of TIMSS demands speciﬁc
regression techniques for the estimation of the educa-
tional production functions. The sampling design of
TIMSS contains both varying sampling probabilities for
students from different schools and clustered data.
Giving different weights to students who had different
sampling probabilities allows obtaining nationally re-
presentative coefﬁcient estimates. This is done by
applying weighted least squares (WLS) as a regression
technique for all regressions performed with the data
(cf. Wooldridge, 2001).
The second issue of clustered data is more trouble-
some. In each country, participating schools were
chosen in a ﬁrst step, and then the classes which took
the standardized tests within each school in a second
step. Therefore, the primary sampling units (PSU) are
not the individual observations, the students, but instead
their schools. The problem arises that the observations
within the cluster of a school are not independent as they
share common characteristics, which cannot be totally
controlled for. The error term of the regression may
therefore be more complex than assumed by conven-
tional least-squares methods, comprising besides an
individual component also class and school elements.
Ignoring these latter parts can lead to spurious regres-
sion results, as the supposedly independent observations
depend on each other.
The method of clustering-robust linear regression
(CRLR) offers a solution to the obstacle. It allows for
any dependence of observations within the PSU,students in the two grades do not differ systematically in
unobserved characteristics. However, Kane and Staiger (2001)
have shown that much of the performance difference between
the students of two consecutive grades in the same school is
actually noise (sampling variation and variation due to non-
persistent sources). Despite this shortcoming, the mean 7th-
grade score enters statistically signiﬁcantly positive as an
explanatory variable for 8th-grade performance in all countries
and subjects. The general pattern of our results and all the main
ﬁndings are strongly corroborated by this alternative speciﬁca-
tion. Detailed results are available from the authors upon
request.
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cluster design and treating dependent observations as
independent by using standard formulas would result in
standard errors that are too small (White, 1980). There
is no impact on the coefﬁcients of the parameters,
however. Therefore, the standard errors estimated by
OLS, or in our case WLS, need to be corrected. The
clustering-robust variance–covariance matrix of the
coefﬁcient estimates V
_
ðb
_
Þ can be approached by
V
_
ðb
_
Þ ¼ ðX 0WX Þ1
X
s
X 0sW sese
0
sW sX s
 !
ðX 0WX Þ1,
(2)
where b
_
represents the coefﬁcients b0 to b3 from model
(1), the matrix X all explanatory variables, W is the
weight matrix and ese
0
s are the cluster matrices of the
WLS residuals from each cluster es (White, 1980, p. 821;
see also Deaton, 1997, pp. 73–78).
This formula offers a consistent estimate of the
variance–covariance matrix of the WLS estimator, even
if the error variances differ across clusters and arbitrary
correlation patterns exist within clusters. A supposition
is a ﬁxed cluster size as the sample size increases, which
is fulﬁlled because the number of students tested in each
school is independent of the overall number of students
in the sample. For the estimation of the educational
production functions of the individual countries, model
(1) will be estimated by CRLR. Hence, the WLS
coefﬁcients and clustering-robust estimated standard
errors will be presented for the production functions.
Whenever merged data of several countries are analyzed,
a dummy for each but one country is included in the
regressions. This allows for a correlation of error terms
within countries, which is likely.
3.3.2. Estimating the effect of resources
While the impact of background and institutional
measures on students’ educational achievement can
reasonably be estimated by the CRLR-level model (1),
the impact of a school’s resource endowment and its
correct identiﬁcation are hotly disputed topics in the
literature on educational production (cf. Hanushek,
2003; Krueger, 2003). The causality of the resource–
performance link is ambiguous since the supposedly
exogenous resource variables might be inﬂuenced by
actual performance of the students and might thus be
endogenous (cf. Hoxby, 2000). Estimating the effect of
resources, especially of class size, on student achieve-
ment is therefore burdensome. Inasmuch as the TIMSS
data come from an observational study and not an
experiment, the coefﬁcient may be biased by the non-
random allocation of students to different class sizes,
both between schools and within schools. Controlling
for these biases is essential in order to obtain a
consistent estimate for the effect of resources.Several mechanisms are imaginable that lead to the
non-random allocation of students between schools,
depending on the schooling system. Parents may either
move to districts that offer smaller classes to their
children, or the local school administration might put
low-performing students into schools with smaller
classes, especially when various types of schools are
available. In both cases, between-school sorting takes
place and biases the estimator of the class size effect.
One strategy to eliminate all variation between
schools is to control for school ﬁxed effects (SFE). For
its implementation, a dummy variable D for each school
is included in model (1), leading to the model
Tics ¼ aDs þ b0 þ Bicsb1 þ Rcsb2 þ ics. (3)
The institutional variables I that are mostly deter-
mined at the school level, are not included in this model
because the inclusion of the school dummies removes all
possible variation between them. This model is referred
to as SFE model.7
Having controlled for between-school variation and
having only between-grade variation left, a potential
bias may still stem from within-school sorting. In order
to account for the non-random allocation of students to
different class sizes within a school, the technique of
instrumental variables (IV) is used. Akerhielm (1995)
instrumented actual class size with average class size for
a given subject in the school and student enrollment at
the given grade. The legitimacy of using student
enrollment as an instrument is questionable, however,
as overall school enrollment may also exert an impact on
student achievement (Summers & Wolfe, 1975; Angrist
& Lavy, 1999).
In this analysis, actual class size is instrumented by
average class size at the grade level. It is highly
correlated with actual class and, by assumption, not
with the error term. It affects student achievement only
indirectly through the impact on actual class size. For
the regression, a two-stage least-squares estimation
procedure is used. Actual class size S is regressed on
average class size at the grade level A, the other
exogenous variables C and the school dummies D:
Sc ¼ a1Ac þ a2Cics þ a3Ds þ ics. (4)
The predicted value S
_
c ¼ Sc  ics consists of the non-
random part Sc and the random part ics: Using only the
systematic part of Sc, no correlation will exist between
S
_
c and ics; allowing the second stage of the regression to
produce a consistent estimator for class size:
Tics ¼ g1S
_
c þ g2Cics þ g3Ds þ ics. (5)
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sorting effects, the coefﬁcient g1 should then be a
consistent estimate of the relationship between class size
and student achievement. Model (5) combines the SFE
model and the IV technique and is referred to as
SFE+IV.8 The only variation left to explain is within-
school between-grade variation.9 Therefore, comparable
data are needed for at least two grades, if possible
adjacent ones, for each school to implement this
estimation strategy. Fortunately, the TIMSS data fulﬁll
this requirement and thus the regression strategy can be
implemented.4. Results
The results of the estimation of educational produc-
tion functions for the seven transition countries are
discussed for each category of explanatory variables. In
addition, a closer look is paid to possible interaction
effects and to the effect of resources that are measured in
the form of class size.
4.1. Results of the educational production functions
The production functions have all been estimated by
CRLR (cf. Section 3.3.1) using model (1). First, the test
scores are regressed only on the student background
variables, then the resource and the institutional
variables are added to the production function, respec-
tively.
4.1.1. Student background
The variables of the student background in Table 2
feature the largest and most signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of the
production function, which is in line with the results
from other estimations in the literature.10 The estimates
in Table 2 do not yet control for resource and
institutional measures, in order to obtain estimates of
the total impact of family background on student
performance, including any effect that might work
through families’ differential access to schools.
The results show large and statistically signiﬁcant
performance differences by grade, age, gender, immigra-
tion status, parental education, and the number of
books at home in basically all countries and in both
subjects. The coefﬁcients from the regressions for the
science test score are very close to the math estimates8See Wo¨Xmann and West (2002) for details on the SFE+IV
method.
9This variation is similar to the one identiﬁed by Hoxby
(2000), who exploits random variations over time in student
enrollments to identify exogenous variation in class sizes.
10The marginal effects conﬁrm the great effect of the student
background variables relative to other variables.but on average slightly lower. This suggests that
student characteristics and background have less
effect on the science test score, so that it depends
on a student’s ‘quality’ to a lesser degree. The only
coefﬁcient that is consistently larger in absolute terms
for science is the one on students’ sex. The negative
effect of being a female student is even larger in science
than in math.11
Across the different countries, a pattern of the
magnitude of the coefﬁcients is apparent. In CSK and
HUN, the coefﬁcients always have the greatest values in
absolute terms. In ROM and LVA instead, the values
are the lowest whenever they are statistically signiﬁcant,
except for the community location. In general, the
countries belonging to the ﬁrst group have higher
coefﬁcients than the countries of the second group. This
pattern is especially clear for the variables concerning
the students’ family background.
Table 3 shows the F-statistics from a test on equal
student background coefﬁcients for all combinations
of countries. For the majority of combinations, the
difference in student background coefﬁcients is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, justifying our presenta-
tion of results by individual countries. Only for countries
of the ﬁrst group, four of the six possible combina-
tions have no signiﬁcantly different coefﬁcients at
the 5% signiﬁcance level for science and one combina-
tion for math. Taking an F-statistic of 4 as a cutoff
value, the separation of the countries into the two
groups emerges quite clearly. All combinations of
countries of the ﬁrst group can then be grouped together
and all of the second group as well, except for the
combination LTU-ROM. There are also few combina-
tions of countries between the groups who have an
F-statistic below 4. However, these combinations differ
between the subjects, while the within group combina-
tions with a low F-statistic are identical for both
subjects.
The lower coefﬁcients in the second group of
countries imply that background differences between
students affect the test scores less in this group. This
suggests that in countries, where the reform process
commenced later and where, at least in the Baltic States,
the Russian grip over the country was strongest, a major
aim of schooling was the homogenous performance of
students. The outcomes are relatively low mean scores,
lower variations in the test scores in these three countries
as well as lower returns to individual characteristics in
schools. The extreme two cases are ROM for a system
that seems hardly unchanged from communist times and
CSK with great returns to individual background
features.11For a detailed discussion of gender differences in TIMSS,
see Mullis, Martin, Fierros, Goldberg, and Stemler (2000).
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Table 2
Student background and educational performance
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci.
Upper grade 70.92* (5.92) 57.02* (5.54) 63.49* (3.09) 56.78* (3.44) 63.05* (4.90) 41.64* (4.18) 61.06* (4.19) 54.32* (4.08) 67.25* (4.44) 86.56* (4.56) 48.51* (4.24) 61.90* (4.25) 33.90* (3.93) 40.06* (5.11)
Age
33.41*
(2.83)
18.30*
(2.82)
31.63*
(2.11)
23.51*
(2.04)
22.46*
(3.31)
13.20*
(3.57)
20.73*
(2.74)
18.77*
(2.80)
23.97*
(2.56)
16.63*
(2.91)
16.87*
(2.51)
11.96*
(2.31)
7.85* (2.48) 6.73
**
(3.30)
Female
13.34*
(3.25)
25.70*
(2.72)
7.00* (2.36) 21.47
*
(2.28)
7.10* (2.42) 22.13
*
(2.64)
5.99**
(2.39)
19.34*
(2.45)
4.36*** (2.67) 9.72* (2.64) 6.92* (2.41) 14.20
*
(2.42)
2.55 (2.55) 9.01* (2.92)
Immigrant
22.07*
(8.06)
14.45***
(7.49)
7.26 (8.36) 18.46
***
(10.00)
1.87 (4.18)
12.86*
(3.68)
1.65 (8.19) 11.64 (8.46) 8.03 (9.64) 14.02
***
(9.33)
14.29***
(7.39)
22.36**
(9.03)
16.09** (6.36) 8.46 (7.93)
Living with both
parents
14.92* (4.83) 9.39* (3.55) 7.80*** (4.09) 9.06** (4.15) 2.36 (3.87) .04 (3.70) 1.65 (2.74) 4.42
***
(2.63)
1.25 (3.20) 4.98 (3.81) .71 (2.82) 2.69 (3.09) 3.52 (3.62) 3.91 (4.51)
Parents’ education
Finished secondary 24.25* (3.51) 14.82* (3.43) 7.39*** (4.03) 6.54 (4.58) 23.99* (2.90) 16.40* (3.17) 15.43* (3.25) 12.32* (4.01)
11.02***
(6.10)
4.92 (5.77) .47 (4.31) 2.43 (3.83) 1.93 (5.40) 1.02 (7.19)
Finished university 47.17* (4.68) 33.59* (4.67) 47.16* (6.14) 37.18* (5.76) 49.34* (4.22) 36.08* (4.71) 40.11* (4.51) 35.56* (4.68) 31.61* (6.59) 23.10* (6.55) 29.16* (5.32) 25.13* (4.52) 21.39* (7.03) 20.85** (9.02)
Books at home
in ln 22.59* (1.89) 20.17* (1.85) 22.61* (1.49) 19.98* (1.51) 18.57* (1.58) 17.42* (1.58) 21.54* (1.33) 19.14* (1.40) 17.92* (1.16) 13.36* (1.44) 15.39* (1.74) 10.05* (1.63) 11.97* (1.72) 12.68* (2.05)
Community location
Close to center 5.75 (7.93) 1.81 (5.14) 8.90** (4.45) 10.29* (3.75) 2.78 (3.88) 1.47 (3.32) .18 (5.70) .90 (5.36) 7.34*** (4.32) 2.71 (4.58) 4.69 (4.92) 1.00 (4.22) 19.98* (6.78) 16.38** (8.31)
Cons
832.19*
(41.99)
671.24*
(39.08)
796.56*
(31.38)
724.60*
(29.55)
706.08*
(46.73)
633.38*
(50.86)
671.68*
(38.09)
673.21*
(39.78)
647.59*
(34.38)
556.97*
(41.41)
603.36*
(37.85)
544.20*
(33.03)
506.50*
(36.17)
494.08*
(48.99)
Signiﬁcance levels (based on robust standard errors): *1%, **5%, ***10%.
Separate least-squares regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. Dependent variable: TIMSS math/science test score. Clustering-
robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3
F-statistics on equal student background coefﬁcients
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
CSK — 1.44 1.32 1.67*** 9.08* 6.82* 6.72*
HUN 2.54* — 3.19* 1.90** 11.49* 8.26* 6.03*
SVN 3.19* 3.99* — .94 11.13* 5.15* 4.44*
SLV 3.63* 2.85* .72 — 8.31* 4.43* 3.65*
LTU 5.75* 4.98* 2.26** 2.06** — 3.29* 6.98*
LVA 7.49* 5.24* 3.81* 2.77* 2.89* — 2.84*
ROM 14.77* 13.15* 8.47* 7.18* 6.62* 3.08* —
Note: Statistics below the diagonal are for math, those above the diagonal are for science.
Prob. F40: *1%, **5%, and ***10%.
A. Ammermu¨ller et al. / Economics of Education Review 24 (2005) 579–599 5874.1.2. Resources, teacher characteristics and institutional
setting
The coefﬁcients of the category of resource and
teacher inputs are shown in Table 4 and indicate the
relationships between the differences in school endow-
ments and teaching staff and their students’ test scores.
The estimated relationships are useful for policy
implications, as resources are allocated to schools by
policy makers. The evidence on class size is examined in
detail in Section 4.3 below. The speciﬁc needs of schools
are reﬂected in the variable ‘Great shortage of materi-
als’, as compared to some or no shortage. It is mostly
negative though seldom signiﬁcant. The characteristics
of teachers give only small insights into a further
explanation of students’ test scores.
Most of the variables that describe the institutional
setting at the school level through stating the degree of
responsibility and autonomy that school heads and
teachers have are statistically insigniﬁcantly related to
student performance. Table 5 presents the results. When
teachers have a strong inﬂuence on the curriculum, the
direction of the effect seems to depend on whether they
act individually or collectively. In the former case, the
coefﬁcient is mostly positive, though only once statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient for a collective inﬂuence
is instead negative in the majority of cases but never
statistically signiﬁcant. Individual or class teachers have
an informational advantage and do not act as an interest
group, which is the case for collective teachers’ inﬂuence
or that of teacher unions.
The results for the inﬂuence of resources, teacher
characteristics and the institutional setting feature far
less statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, which are of a
lower magnitude than those for the ﬁrst category of
student background variables. Moreover, the effects of
greater endowments of schools are somewhat ambig-
uous. Most unexpected signs of effects can be attributed
to the unusual distribution within countries, or are
discussed more extensively later on in the case of class
size. However, there is no consistent picture that clearlyindicates the merits for students from greater resources
or better staff. A proper endowment with materials,
teachers’ experience and their educational level of a
Master’s degree still seem to be related to higher test
scores of students in some cases. Possible beneﬁcial side
effects of the variables that are not grasped directly by
the variable itself are examined later on in Section 4.4
with the help of interaction variables.
The limited number of schools, around 150 per
country, allows only for little measurable variation
within a country and leads to low degrees of freedom
when all 23 explaining variables are included in the
regression. This concerns the variables on school
responsibility and teacher inﬂuence on the curriculum,
which are measured at the school level. For the other
variables, which are measured at the class level,
the degrees of freedom should sufﬁce but the effects
are not clear-cut either. It seems that differences in the
institutional setting are mainly relevant for understand-
ing the cross-country variation in student performance
(Wo¨Xmann, 2003), whereas the descriptive statistics in
Table A3 show that there is little variation in the
institutional setting within most Eastern European
countries which could lead to a variation in test scores.
Still, if we compare the optimal institutional setting with
the least favorable one, taking into account only
coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at least at
the 10% level, students score on average around 50
points higher in CSK for math and around 20 points for
science. A difference of 50 points is half of the
international standard deviation of test scores and
around one-tenth of the mean score. Hence, institutions
do matter in some countries, and their setting should not
be neglected, especially since a modiﬁcation might be
achievable at lower cost than an increase in resources.
4.1.3. Explanatory power of the three categories of
variables
The statistical signiﬁcance and magnitude of the
coefﬁcients from the three categories of variables are
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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A. Ammermu¨ller et al. / Economics of Education Review 24 (2005) 579–599588reﬂected in their contribution to the explanatory power
of the models. Table 6 displays the R2 for the regressions
including all variables and the percentage decrease in R2
when categories of variables are excluded from the
regression. When the student background variables are
excluded, the R2 drops by over 75% in all countries
except for ROM. Institutional and resource variables
contribute only little to the share of the explained
variance in test scores. The highest R2 for the entire
model is reached in LTU, where a quarter of the
variation of the science test scores can be explained by
the production function. ROM instead features the
lowest values in both math and science, which is only
slightly above 11%. The values differ greatly between
countries, which might either suggest that the model
used to estimate the production function suits certain
countries better or that the quality of the data is lower in
others.
4.1.4. Sensitivity analysis of the imputation technique
The estimations of the production functions have also
been performed with the original values only. For each
variable included in model (1), all imputed values (cf.
Section 3.1) have been dropped. These ‘robust’ estimates
are not affected by the method of imputation. This
sensitivity analysis of the results examines whether
changes in the data, in this case the introduction of
changes through the imputation of values, alter the
outcome of the regressions, in which case inferences
from these data would seem fragile (Mukherjee, White,
& Wuyts, 1998).
In general, there are no great distinctions between the
two differently estimated coefﬁcients for each variable.
No statistically signiﬁcant variable changes its sign.
However, some statistically insigniﬁcant variables
change signs and for others the statistical signiﬁcance
level changes.
Given that the estimates are so close to each other, the
imputation technique should not have led to a bias of
the data and the inferences are not fragile. Having the
full dataset available for the estimations is of great
advantage because the higher amount of observations
allows for a better explanation of the variation. This is
shown by the decreasing standard errors. Basing the
estimation of the effect of school or class differences on
even fewer observations might have led to even weaker
inferences. Thus, the imputation of missing values was a
worthwhile step in the estimation of the educational
production functions.
4.2. Interaction effects
This section considers possible interaction effects
between variables of the educational production func-
tion. The interaction terms have been included sepa-
rately at the end of model (1) and indicate any further
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Table 5
Institutional settings and educational performance
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci. Math Sci.
School responsibilities
Autonomy 7.80 (4.97) 3.02 (3.40) 10.58***
(5.76)
6.26 (4.02) 3.09 (6.38) 3.85 (5.26) 3.12 (3.25) 2.13 (3.01) .77 (4.27) 1.72 (4.77) 6.43 (6.58) 1.65 (4.73) 3.45 (3.53) 1.00 (4.51)
Determining
teacher’s salary
8.12 (6.95) 5.92 (5.36) 5.72 (6.14) 7.24***
(4.11)
3.28 (4.25) .65 (3.98) 6.52 (6.89) 3.66 (8.51) 10.87**
(5.05)
.37 (6.52) 1.73 (5.41) 7.79 (4.92) 2.56 (10.65) 6.23 (10.65)
Strong infl. on curriculum
Teachers individually 14.32***
(7.88)
3.62 (5.88) 7.36 (6.24) 4.86 (5.64) .46 (6.93) 4.75 (6.40) 3.12 (9.26) 2.11 (7.96) 6.23 (4.67) 6.44 (4.90) 3.04 (4.79) .96 (4.13) 10.37 (11.24) 15.70 (10.47)
Teachers collectively 7.92 (7.28) 2.72 (5.08) 1.14 (5.52) 1.60 (5.08) 6.31 (8.91) 1.10 (7.95) 2.86 (11.56) .70 (9.94) 1.59 (4.49) 1.55 (5.20) 3.14 (5.20) 3.00 (4.33) 6.53 (17.57) 3.08 (19.86)
Class teacher has strong influence on
Supplies or subject
matter
.90 (8.80) 5.33 (4.39) 2.47 (4.55) 5.57 (3.48) 16.12* (6.03) 4.28 (4.89) .51 (6.62) .32 (5.26) 14.43 (10.24) 10.67 (6.65) 1.12 (8.08) 3.09 (5.15) 8.03 (8.96) 12.25 (9.75)
Kind supplies/
textbooks
4.90 (5.17) 4.19 (4.70) 2.99 (5.35) 6.67***
(3.73)
4.74 (3.76) 5.07 (3.69) 7.33 (6.27) 2.07 (4.99) 2.72 (7.57) 6.77 (7.16) 1.33 (5.56) .49 (4.52) 19.41** (8.28) 11.69 (8.99)
Additional
Homework 19.23***
(9.86)
6.62 (10.15) 3.22 (3.57) 1.47 (2.68) 1.68 (2.02) 4.82 (6.56) 2.07 (3.13) 9.26 (10.40) 2.66 (2.12) 5.43 (3.41) 3.03 (2.75) 7.29** (2.82) 1.93 (1.29) 10.07** (4.18)
Unint. parents limit
teaching
19.79*
(6.62)
19.11**
(9.47)
8.40 (6.65) 1.84 (5.71) .58 (5.19) 7.43**
(3.71)
1.38 (8.01) 11.82 (7.45) 2.64 (6.63) 7.69 (9.61) 9.26***
(4.99)
4.40 (5.62) .63 (5.05) 5.73 (6.29)
Signiﬁcance levels (based on robust standard errors): *1%, **5%, and ***10%.
Separate least-squares regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. Dependent variable: TIMSS math/science test score. Controlling for
all student background variables reported in Table 2 and for all resource variables reported in Table 4. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6
R2 and percentage decrease in R2 when categories of variables are excluded
Excl. category CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Math .1996 .2208 .1770 .1476 .2379 .1282 .1253
Background (%) 79.71 85.24 88.70 91.67 76.33 91.42 50.84
Resources (%) 3.26 2.54 .34 2.03 3.61 2.42 14.76
Institutions (%) 11.02 1.77 2.66 1.42 2.31 3.35 7.58
Science .1615 .1761 .1321 .1284 .2505 .1443 .1111
Background (%) 85.26 89.44 89.48 94.47 89.66 79.42 59.59
Resources (%) 3.34 1.02 2.35 1.71 3.07 3.26 15.30
Institutions (%) 4.27 1.76 1.89 1.56 1.80 2.70 14.58
13This may not be a serious problem, though, because teacher
aides are rare in the sampled countries and because teacher
A. Ammermu¨ller et al. / Economics of Education Review 24 (2005) 579–599590effects a variable may have in connection with other
variables.12
In both math and science, students seem to perform
better under a teacher of the same sex. This is true
for both boys and girls. The additional effect of teacher
experience of teachers who hold a Master degree
on students varies across countries. It is twice statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly negative in ROM, due to the extremely
high coefﬁcient of the Master level. In HUN, the effect
is statistically signiﬁcantly positive for science, where
the coefﬁcient of a Master degree is statistically
signiﬁcantly negative, and negative for math, where
the Master coefﬁcient is positive. The interaction
effects seem thus to offset some of the counterintuitive
effects in the production function. The effect of class size
does not consistently depend on the experience of
teachers or on their educational level. When teachers
hold a Master degree, class size exerts an additional
signiﬁcantly negative effect on student performance
in three cases and a signiﬁcantly positive effect in
two cases.
When the students’ parents have more than 200
books, the positive coefﬁcient of class size is intensiﬁed
in ﬁve countries. The positive interaction term could
support the hypothesis of Lazear (2001) that the optimal
class size for well-behaved students is larger than that
for more disruptive students.
4.3. Analyses of the class size effect
The class size measure available in the TIMSS
database is superior to most other studies, which often
only have data on pupil–teacher ratios at the school
level, in that each math and science teacher reports the
size of her speciﬁc math and science class. Therefore, the
TIMSS class size measure measures class size correctly
even if students change classes between subjects.
However, TIMSS does not report whether there are12Detailed results are available from the authors upon
request.additional teacher aides in a classroom.13 In order to
give more scrutiny to the possible endogeneity bias in
the least-squares estimation of resource effects, we
analyze the class size effect in greater detail. We ﬁrst
look at class size effects in different segments of class
sizes to see whether this is indicative of sorting of
students into differently sized classes, and then we
implement the model combining SFE and IV derived in
Section 3.3.2 to eliminate any effects of between- and
within-school sorting from the estimate of the class size
effect.
4.3.1. Class size effects for class segments
In each country, the class size effect is estimated
separately for three segments of class sizes, the lower,
middle and upper segment. The class sizes that are
included in the segments are chosen such that the
difference between the number of students in the
segments is minimized for each country. Thus, the
segments can cover different class sizes across countries.
In CSK (HUN) for example, the lower segment
comprises classes up to a class size of 23 (21), the
middle one classes between 24 (22) and 26 (25) and the
upper classes with more than 26 (25) students. In order
to avoid further bias, all explanatory variables of the
production function are included in the estimation and
control for other effects. As the number of classes whose
size is estimated is greatly reduced in the regressions,
standard errors of the class size coefﬁcient increase for
the individual categories.
It is enticing to compare the overall coefﬁcients of
class size to the coefﬁcients from the segments. If the
coefﬁcients for class size of the segmented student
population were mainly consistent and pointed in the
same direction as the overall coefﬁcient, this would giveaides have been found to have negligible effects on student
performance even in studies that ﬁnd signiﬁcant class size
effects (Krueger, 1999).
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Table 7
Class size coefﬁcients for class segments
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM EAST
All students
Math class 2.18** (.92) .50 (.38) .44 (.59) .23 (.51) 1.62* (.53) .36 (.31) 1.37* (.47) .80* (.20)
Science class 1.22*** (.69) .24 (.34) .50 (.54) .82 (.67) .20 (.44) .43*** (.26) .67 (.69) .37*** (.20)
Lower segment
Math class .23 (1.38) .19 (.83) .30 (1.82) .04 (1.12) 1.53 (1.21) 1.36 (.83) .98 (1.18) .24 (.40)
Science class .50 (.92) .17 (.83) 3.04** (1.25) .90 (1.02) 1.46 (1.23) 1.56 (.96) 1.46 (1.49) .46 (.41)
Middle segment
Math class 16.52* (5.02) 5.35*** (2.61) 10.15* (3.68) 6.53 (4.47) .45 (7.33) 1.94 (2.19) 1.10 (2.89) 3.78* (1.42)
Science class 5.00 (5.92) 3.62 (2.64) 7.75*** (4.28) 5.61 (3.64) 4.02 (6.49) 2.28 (4.03) 1.40 (3.13) 2.65 (1.79)
Upper segment
Math class .06 (2.89) 2.83 (2.03) 3.43 (2.07) 1.40 (3.17) 4.36* (1.51) 2.06** (.78) 4.68* (1.44) 1.55* (.64)
Science class 4.78** (2.18) 2.88** (1.27) .86 (1.73) .98 (2.50) 1.30* (.41) 1.11* (.31) 4.78* (1.72) .57 (.39)
Mean math class 25.35 22.41 24.67 26.09 20.86 21.65 26.67 23.95
Mean science class 25.52 22.14 24.42 26.54 21.63 23.74 26.23 24.32
Signiﬁcance levels (based on robust standard errors): *1%, **5%, and ***10%.
Separate least-squares regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. Dependent variable:
TIMSS math/science test score. Controlling for all student background variables reported in Table 2, for all other resource variables
reported in Table 4, and for all institutional variables reported in Table 5. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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identical for different ranges of class sizes. However, if
there were greatly varying coefﬁcients and especially
statistically signiﬁcantly negative ones among them, this
would point to an outside involvement like the non-
random allocation of students. If this were the case and
the low-performing students were put into smaller
classes, then the effect for a limited range within which
no selection takes place might still be negative. If the
segment coefﬁcients were negative but the overall
coefﬁcient positive, a selection between segments would
seem likely. A positive coefﬁcient would indicate that
selection takes place within the considered range instead.
The results shown in Table 7 cannot reveal any clear
evidence on whether between- or within-school selection
takes place, though. The results from the segmented
class size estimations are not very consistent. For each
country, both positive and negative coefﬁcients are
reported, with the exception of LVA with only negative
coefﬁcients. There are 11 statistically signiﬁcantly
positive coefﬁcients versus four statistically signiﬁcantly
negative coefﬁcients. For the merged dataset EAST that
contains all seven transition countries and country
dummies, there are statistically signiﬁcantly positive
coefﬁcients for the overall estimates and statistically
signiﬁcantly positive ones for math in the middle and
upper segment. The variation of the coefﬁcients is
greatest in the middle segment and lowest in the lower
segment. For science more negative coefﬁcients are
estimated as compared to math, where only the LVA
coefﬁcient in the upper segment is statistically signiﬁ-cantly negative. The inconsistency of the coefﬁcients
across countries and across segments can be interpreted
as an indication of a possible bias of the class size
coefﬁcient in the production function but is clearly no
proof of it.
4.3.2. Eliminating effects of between- and within-school
selection
In order to control for selection that takes place
between schools when measuring the class size effect, a
dummy for each school in the country is added to the
regression, leading to the SFE model (3) derived in
Section 3.3.2. The few schools that tested only one class
are excluded from the estimation of this model. The
class size coefﬁcients of the SFE model shown in Table 8
are smaller than for the survey regressions in 11 out of
14 cases. The standard errors increase only slightly. The
results indicate that when excluding the effect of
between-school selection of students, a positive effect
of class size on test scores appears less likely. The change
is most drastic in CSK, where the statistically signiﬁ-
cantly positive class size coefﬁcient turns negative for
math and is around zero for science. In LVA for math, a
statistically signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient results from
the control for SFE. Only two coefﬁcients in LTU and
ROM for math remain signiﬁcantly positive. In these
two countries, the different model has hardly any
inﬂuence on the coefﬁcients.
In a second step, the selection within schools is
additionally controlled for by using the average class
size at the grade level as an instrument for actual class
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Table 8
The coefﬁcient on class size in different models
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Math
Least squares 2.18** (.92) .50 (.38) .44 (.59) .23 (.51) 1.62* (.53) .36 (.31) 1.37* (.47)
School ﬁxed effects .70 (1.80) .18 (.51) .20 (.82) .01 (.65) 1.64*** (.85) 1.06* (.39) 1.51* (.56)
SFE+IV .23 (2.89) .49 (1.60) .89 (4.96)
Science
Least squares 1.22*** (.69) .24 (.34) .50 (.54) .82 (.67) .20 (.44) .43*** (.26) .67 (.69)
School ﬁxed effects .14 (1.15) .11 (.56) .43 (.74) 1.03 (.82) .01 (.57) .25 (.48) .52 (.62)
SFE+IV .88 (1.78) .04 (1.27) .61 (2.44)
Students LS/SFE 6672/6659 5978/5962 5606/5576 7101 5056 4976/4917 7471/7462
Schools LS/SFE 150/149 150/149 122/121 145 145 143/141 163/162
Average difference (std. dev.) in class size between the two grades of a school
Math class .52 (4.10) .68 (5.28) 1.55 (3.64) .75 (4.89) .06 (4.37) .08 (7.18) 2.87 (5.77)
Science class .40 (4.08) .22 (4.89) 1.34 (3.68) .75 (4.05) .49 (5.72) 1.76 (9.27) 2.21 (5.69)
Instrument .34 (4.38) 1.64 (3.64) .52 (5.27)
Signiﬁcance levels (based on robust standard errors): *1%, **5%, and ***10%.
Separate regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. Dependent variable: TIMSS math/
science test score. Controlling for all explanatory variables in least-squares regression and for student background variables, teacher
characteristics and education in SFE regressions. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.
14Hausman tests reject the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients are
different between the SFE and the SFE+IV model in only one
of the three countries. For the other two countries, the
statistical power of the SFE+IV model seems too limited to
detect statistically signiﬁcant differences.
A. Ammermu¨ller et al. / Economics of Education Review 24 (2005) 579–599592size (cf. Section 3.3.2). The model and corresponding
technique (SFE+IV) can only be applied to three
countries, for which sufﬁcient data are available on the
instrument. To check whether there is enough variation
in our instrument—the average class size in a grade—
between the two grades within individual schools, the
bottom of Table 8 reports the country mean and its
standard deviation in average class size between the 7th
and 8th grade of a school. In the three countries for
which this measure is available, the between-grade
variation within schools, as measured by this standard
deviation, is actually comparable in size to the original
standard deviation of class size in our samples (cf. Table
A3). Therefore, the variation we use in this identiﬁcation
seems large enough for the estimation. Furthermore, in
order for this identiﬁcation strategy to be identiﬁed, we
have to assume that the class size effect is the same
across grades. While this is not necessarily generally true
(cf. Todd &Wolpin, 2003) and class size effects may well
differ between, say, ﬁrst grade and tenth grade, it may be
reasonable to assume that the effect does not change
signiﬁcantly between the 7th and the 8th grade. We test
this in the SFE model and indeed ﬁnd that there is no
statistically signiﬁcant difference between the two grades
in the class size estimate in any country or subject,
except for weakly statistically signiﬁcant differences for
math in SLV and in LTU.
For math, the consistent SFE+IV model leads to
slightly positive coefﬁcients in CSK and SVN, which are
statistically highly insigniﬁcant, though. In ROM, the
former signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient turns negative.This is as well the case for science, where two of the three
coefﬁcients for class size are negative, however still
insigniﬁcantly. The estimates correspond to the intuitive
reasoning that a smaller classroom is a better learning
environment for students and should beneﬁt their scores.
The relatively large standard errors of the coefﬁcients do
not allow for pinpointing the exact effect.14 It can only be
said that it is approximately close to zero or even slightly
negative. The results do not support a positive resour-
ce–performance link, but they do show that the counter-
intuitive least-squares coefﬁcients are likely to be biased.
In CSK, selection between schools seems to be the
major cause of bias in the class size coefﬁcient. Low-
performing students seem to be allocated to schools that
have lower class sizes than those schools of the better
students. In ROM instead, between-school selection
seems to introduce no bias, but within-school selection
does seem to. This might as well be the case in LTU and
could explain the statistically signiﬁcantly positive
coefﬁcient of class size after controlling for SFE. The
difference in the origin of the selection bias seems to be
related to the structure of the school system. In the more
diverse systems in CSK and HUN, students of the
considered age of about 13 can choose between two
types of schools, and the more able students are
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Table 9
Educational production in Eastern and Western Europe
East First Second West
Student and family characteristics
Upper grade 58.36* (1.71) 66.05* (2.31) 49.78* (2.49) 55.72* (2.14)
Age 22.52* (1.03) 28.25* (1.39) 16.22* (1.49) 20.75* (1.31)
Female 5.22* (1.00) 8.07* (1.34) 1.83 (1.49) 9.89* (1.47)
Immigrant 5.71*** (3.16) 2.46 (3.00) 10.15** (4.66) 25.63* (3.20)
Living with both parents .75 (1.45) 6.29* (1.91) 1.08 (1.91) 5.44* (1.57)
Parents’ education
Finished secondary 11.07* (1.76) 17.79* (1.79) .25 (3.30) 9.10* (2.23)
Finished university 37.80* (2.10) 45.04* (2.44) 24.15* (3.73) 28.91* (2.90)
Books at home 16.68* (.67) 20.72* (.78) 13.62* (.95) 14.93* (.68)
Close to the center 3.59 (2.20) 2.64 (2.86) 6.81** (3.24) 3.84 (3.33)
Resources and teacher characteristics
Math class size .80* (.20) .68** (.28) .81* (.27) 1.62* (.37)
Great shortage of materials 2.19 (2.55) .58 (3.17) 3.11 (3.60) 3.85 (3.45)
Math teacher char. and education
Teacher is female .69 (2.73) 2.07 (3.24) 5.36 (4.50) 4.83*** (2.69)
Teacher’s exper. in ln 5.04* (1.47) 4.21** (1.95) 5.43** (2.26) 2.76 (2.04)
BA or equivalent 1.59 (3.97) 6.86 (5.39) 5.12 (4.94) 3.47 (4.81)
MA/Ph.D. 4.37 (6.00) 14.46 (9.11) 4.97 (7.68) 4.91 (5.86)
Institutional setting
School responsibilities
Autonomy (budget, suppl., t.) 1.71 (1.85) 5.25** (2.26) 3.06 (2.75) 3.17 (3.65)
Determining teacher salary 1.35 (2.55) 3.79 (3.21) 5.00 (4.03) 5.21 (4.53)
Strong influence on curriculum
Teachers individually 4.48*** (2.51) 5.17 (3.82) 3.75 (3.27) 3.77 (4.20)
Teachers collectively 1.61 (3.01) 2.26 (4.41) .07 (3.65) 14.05* (3.57)
Math class teacher has strong influence
Money for suppl. or subject matter 2.55 (2.83) 3.72 (3.37) .59 (5.28) .33 (2.82)
Kind of supplies or textbooks 3.51 (2.27) 2.60 (2.70) 6.93*** (3.96) .98 (2.50)
Homework 2.25** (.99) 3.71*** (1.95) 1.05 (1.09) 8.18* (1.85)
Uninterested parents limit teaching 4.09*** (2.43) 5.02 (3.55) 2.72 (3.22) 21.00* (5.51)
Cons 598.19* (18.26) 706.45* (24.20) 546.48 (26.57) 664.74* (23.70)
Students 42,815 25,357 17,458 21,933
Schools 1017 567 450 553
Mean math score 500.97 (93.61) 527.09 (91.93) 466.14 (84.00) 505.10 (86.34)
Signiﬁcance levels (based on robust standard errors): *1%, **5%, and ***10%.
Separate least-squares regressions within each country group, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. Dependent variable:
TIMSS math test score. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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general schools exist and students cannot be allocated to
other school types. Therefore, if low performing
students are to receive more resources, selection is more
likely to take place within schools.5. Comparison to Western European countries
In order to see how far the different Eastern European
school systems have converged towards the WesternEuropean ones, we compare the educational production
functions of Eastern and Western European countries.
The merged functions of all Eastern European countries
(EAST), of the ﬁrst group of countries (FIRST) and of
the second group of countries (SECOND) are compared
to a sample of Western European countries (WEST) that
includes Austria, Denmark, France and Germany. They
all are central European countries and long time
members of the EU and should hence be well suited
for a comparison. The respective country dummies are
added to the regressions.
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Table 10
F-statistics on equal coefﬁcients between groups
First/second First/west Second/west
Math
All variables 6.67* 5.40* 5.21*
Background 13.12* 8.61* 8.02*
Science
All variables 7.22* 3.51* 5.63*
Background 14.18* 6.62* 10.81*
Prob. F40: *1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 11
R2 and percentage decrease in R2 when categories of variables
are excluded
Excl. category First Second West
All categories Math .1854 .1541 .2062
Science .1526 .1549 .2506
Background Math (%) 85.81 73.46 67.26
Science (%) 87.68 77.66 54.23
Resources Math (%) 1.40 3.96 2.96
Science (%) .52 1.68 .92
Institutions Math (%) 1.94 1.75 5.92
Science (%) .85 3.62 1.28
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schooling systems of the ﬁrst group of countries have
already moved signiﬁcantly towards those of democratic
market economies, then the production function of the
Western European sample should resemble more the
function of the ﬁrst group than that of the second group.
Table 9 presents the coefﬁcients of estimating model (1)
with the math scores as the dependent variable. The
mean math scores in the bottom right indicate that the
average performance of the sample of Western Eur-
opean countries is only slightly above the average for
Eastern Europe and right between the ﬁrst and the
second group of countries. The coefﬁcients for WEST
are mostly closer to the ﬁrst group and are often
opposed to the estimates of the second group. In the
following, we compare the estimates of the Western
European countries mainly to those of the ﬁrst group
and refer to the mean values of the explanatory
variables.
In the category of student characteristics and back-
ground, the coefﬁcients of WEST and FIRST are close
to each other, except for ‘immigrant’, where the effect in
WEST is clearly negative. Moreover, the Western
countries have higher shares of immigrated students,
which may complicate integration. The average educa-
tion of students’ parents is lower in WEST than in bothEastern groups. The number of books at home in WEST
is instead slightly higher than in the second group but
well below that of the ﬁrst group. It is obvious that
returns to the individual characteristics and the effects of
student background are even higher in FIRST than in
WEST and are relatively low in the second Eastern
group. Schools in the latter group still seem to diminish
the impact of student characteristics and produce a
homogenous output of students. The lower standard
deviation of the math test score of the second group
reﬂects this focus of educational policy. In several
aspects like the returns to individual student character-
istics and the deviation of test scores, the ﬁrst group
seems to have surpassed the Western countries already.
This is underlined by F-tests on equal coefﬁcients
among the groups. Table 10 shows the results for the
category of student background and for all variables. All
F-statistics are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
signiﬁcance level. The coefﬁcients of both Eastern
groups are closer to those of the Western sample than
to each other, implying that the Western coefﬁcients lie
between those of FIRST and SECOND. For math, the
F-statistics imply an equal difference of WEST to the
Eastern groups while for science, the coefﬁcients of
WEST are much closer to FIRST than to SECOND.
Further support is presented in Table 11, which shows
the percentage decrease in R2 for the three groups when
categories of variables are excluded. The background
variables are most important for explaining the test
score variation in all groups, while the resource and
institutional variables have little impact on the explained
variation. Student background effects contribute more
to the R2 in FIRST than in SECOND and WEST. Given
the total R2, background effects account for the biggest
variation in FIRST at .159 ð¼ :185 85:8%Þ; followed
by WEST at .139 and SECOND at .113. This supports
our story that the differentiation of students according
to their background in FIRST has surpassed even that
in WEST. The equalization of educational outcomes is
characteristic for the second group instead and is
illustrated by the low effects of student characteristics
on their performance and the lower deviation of test
scores.6. Conclusion
The analysis of the schooling systems of seven Eastern
European countries by means of estimating their
educational production functions reveals several dis-
tinctive features. First, the countries can be divided into
two groups, which share similar characteristics in their
economic development, the properties of their schooling
systems and the effects that the various factors have on
student test scores. The ﬁrst group of countries, which
includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
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forms earlier than the second group and features a
higher level of both political and economic development.
In the second group, the Baltic States instead remained
under tight Russian control until 1991 and suffered great
economic damage from this strong link. Romania’s
political struggles delayed any reforms and turned it into
the political and economic laggard of this sample of
Eastern European countries. Concerning their schooling
systems, the average student of the ﬁrst group is
endowed with more favorable characteristics and a
higher level of directly measurable resources at schools,
especially in the two countries of former Czechoslova-
kia. Further, the ﬁrst group features the two most
decentralized schooling systems with Hungary and
Slovenia.
When regarding the relationship between the indivi-
dual impact factors and student performance, as
estimated by the educational production function,
distinct patterns emerge for both groups. The effects of
the very signiﬁcant variables on student background,
especially of family circumstances, are consistently
higher in the ﬁrst group, which introduced reforms to
the education systems earlier. In these countries, the
schooling systems seem already to be a mode of
differentiation for the labor market. A comparison with
the sample of Western European countries underlines
the proximity of the ﬁrst group to the Western schooling
systems. It even surpasses the Western sample in several
speciﬁc features, such as the high returns to individual
characteristics of students and a higher variation in test
scores. In the second group, returns to individual
characteristics and especially to family background are
instead lower and student performance varies less. This
gives students more equal opportunities irrespective of
their background but seems to be associated with a
lower average performance. Thus, the second group still
features the patterns of a schooling system whose
primary role is to produce a homogenous output of
students.
The coefﬁcients for resources and the institutional
setting are less signiﬁcant and of a much lower
magnitude in all countries and not consistent within
groups. The merit of increased resources is illustrated for
the experience and educational level of teachers in most
countries. The effect of class size remains ambiguous,
but positive coefﬁcients were shown to be biased by
student selection. Thus, it seems more likely that there is
no effect or even a slightly negative one, especially for
lower levels of class sizes. As the reduction of class size is
very costly, it is doubtful whether a minor negative effect
of larger classes justiﬁes the enormous effort of
decreasing class sizes. Although the institutional setting
has comparatively little impact compared to student
background, differences in the autonomy of schools and
teachers are shown to be positively related to studentperformance in some countries and would be relatively
effortless to modify.
The ﬁndings of this paper carry implications for the
potential future development of the transition countries’
economies. The tested students have by now reached an
age of about 22 and are about to enter the labor market.
The measured schooling quality is thus to take effect on
the countries’ economies in the coming years. Besides
the relatively advantageous economic and political
situation, the ﬁrst group of transition countries also
presides over well functioning schooling systems. The
high development of institutions is visible in the
favorable incentive system in schools, where decentra-
lization has widely progressed and positively affects
student scores. The quick transformation of the school-
ing system in the early years of transition despite the
ﬁnancial and political hurdles is a good foundation for
economic growth in the coming years.
The second group of transition countries instead has
not fully reformed its schooling systems yet. The
countries still feature many traits from communist
times. Institutional reforms may need to be continued
in the coming years.
In the analysis of educational production in Eastern
Europe, there is great scope for further research. It
would be worthwhile that datasets became available
which contain value-added information on the changes
in inputs and performance of individual students, in
order to check the robustness of the results found in this
paper. It would also be desirable to ﬁnd further methods
for bias control that leave more variation in test scores
and are applicable to other inputs as well. Further, it
would be interesting to study the development of other
outcomes of education like social values conveyed to
students, which are essential to form a steady democ-
racy. Another path for further studies would be to
compare the ﬁndings from TIMSS to other studies that
were performed later, like TIMSS-Repeat in 1999 or
PISA in 2000. This could reveal whether the trends of
the schooling systems towards decentralization and
choice have continued and whether the distinction
between the two groups of countries still holds.Acknowledgements
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Table A1
Participation of students, classes and schools in TIMSS
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Students 6672 5978 5606 7101 5056 4976 7471
Classes 299 299 243 290 292 284 325
Schools 150 150 122 145 145 143 163
Sampled students (in %)a .6 .4 3.0 .9 1.0 1.7 .3
aNumber of sampled students over the number of children of compulsory school age in percent.
Table A2
Deﬁnition of variables and range of values
Variable name Deﬁnition Type Min. Max.
Math score Intern. math test score Numeric 141.6 887.44
Science score Intern. science test score Numeric 85.02 872.46
Student and family characteristics
Upper grade Grade level of students Dummy 0 for 7th grade 1 for 8th grade
Age Age of students in years Numeric 10.1 20.4
Female Sex of students Dummy 0 for male 1 for female
Immigrant Origin of students Dummy 0 for other students 1 for immigrated student
or parent
Living with both par. Student’s family situation Dummy 0 for one/no parent 1 for both parents
Parents’ education
No or some secondary Dummy Ref. Ref.
Finished secondary Highest educational level reached
by a parent
Dummy 0 1 for ﬁnished section and
some after
Finished university Dummy 0 1 for ﬁnished university
Books at home Number of books at student’s
home in ln
Categorical 1.61 5.52
in ln
Community location
Non-urban area Location of the student’s
community
Dummy Ref. Ref.
Close to center of town Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for close to center
Resources and teacher characteristics
Class size Size of student’s class Numeric 3 58
No/some shortage Degree of school’s shortage of
materials
Dummy Ref. Ref.
Great shortage of mat. Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for great shortage
Teacher characteristics
Teacher is female Class teacher’s sex Dummy 0 for male 1 for female
Teacher’s exp. in ln Teacher’s exp. in years in ln Numeric 0 3.91
Teacher education
Secondary and less Highest educational level of class
teacher
Dummy Ref. Ref.
BA or equivalent Dummy 0 1 for bachelor/equ.
MA/Ph.D. Dummy 0 1 for master/equ.
Institutional setting
School responsibilities
Autonomy (budget, supplies,
teachers)
Degree of school’s autonomy Categorical 0 for autonomy in no ﬁeld 3 for autonomy in all three
ﬁelds
Determining teacher salary School’s responsibility over setting
salaries
Dummy 0 for no resp. 1 for resp. over salary
Strong influence on curriculum
Teachers individually Inﬂuence of individual or subject
teachers on curr.
Dummy 0 for no inﬂ. 1 for inﬂ. of at least one
group
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Table A2 (continued )
Variable name Deﬁnition Type Min. Max.
Teachers collectively Inﬂ. of teachers collect. or teacher
unions on curr.
Dummy 0 for no inﬂ. 1 for inﬂ. of at least one
group
Class teacher has strong influence on
Money for supplies or subject
matter
Strong inﬂ. of class teacher Dummy 0 for no strong inﬂ. 1 for strong inﬂ. in at least
one ﬁeld
Kind of supplies or textbooks Strong inﬂ. of class teacher Dummy 0 for no strong inﬂ. 1 for strong inﬂ. in at least
one ﬁeld
Additional
Homework Homework for subject in hours per
week
Numeric 1 9.6
Uninterested parents limit
teaching
Teacher notices uncooperative
parents negatively
Dummy 0 for no negative inﬂ. on
students
1 for negative inﬂ. on
students
Min. and max. values include all seven Eastern European countries in both math and science.
Table A3
Means and standard deviations for selected variables
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Math score 543.57 (93.70) 519.05 (93.52) 518.68 (87.43) 527.08 (90.73) 453.72 (81.60) 476.68 (80.82) 468.01 (87.81)
Science score 553.44 (86.90) 535.30 (92.48) 544.42 (88.11) 526.69 (90.16) 441.27 (88.26) 458.59 (83.35) 468.85
(102.33)
Student and family characteristics
Upper grade .50 (.50) .49 (.50) .48 (.50) .49 (.50) .52 (.50) .47 (.50) .50 (.50)
Age 13.89 (.65) 13.82 (.71) 14.27 (.63) 13.77 (.62) 13.84 (.66) 13.77 (.72) 14.12 (.71)
Female .50 (.50) .50 (.50) .51 (.50) .51 (.50) .52 (.50) .52 (.50) .51 (.50)
Immigrant .02 (.14) .02 (.16) .11 (.32) .02 (.14) .02 (.15) .02 (.14) .13 (.34)
Living with both
parents
.89 (.32) .92 (.27) .90 (.30) .83 (.37) .85 (.36) .80 (.40) .74 (.44)
Parents’ education
Finished secondary .55 (.50) .72 (.45) .64 (.48) .58 (.49) .56 (.50) .61 (.49) .57 (.50)
Finished university .21 (.41) .19 (.39) .19 (.39) .22 (.41) .37 (.48) .29 (.45) .09 (.29)
Books at home
Before log transf. 148.49 (80.94) 155.43 (90.35) 111.23 (83.10) 112.03 (79.06) 112.12 (86.61) 184.79 (81.58) 89.85 (95.00)
Community location
Close to the center of
a town
.40 (.49) .45 (.50) .38 (.48) .29 (.45) .61 (.49) .30 (.46) .51 (.50)
Resources and teacher characteristics
Math class size 25.35 (3.36) 22.41 (5.19) 24.66 (3.70) 26.09 (4.32) 20.86 (3.93) 21.65 (6.75) 26.67 (6.46)
Science class size 25.52 (3.41) 22.14 (4.98) 24.42 (3.47) 26.54 (3.48) 21.63 (5.39) 23.75 (7.80) 26.23 (6.49)
Great shortage of
materials
.03 (.18) .17 (.38) .20 (.40) .02 (.14) .22 (.42) .63 (.48) .17 (.37)
Math teacher characteristics
Teacher is female .84 (.36) .85 (.36) .88 (.32) .79 (.41) .85 (.35) .94 (.25) .67 (.47)
Teacher’s exp. before
log transformation
21.36 (11.43) 18.00 (8.92) 15.64 (7.03) 20.47 (9.33) 19.67 (10.36) 17.42 (10.31) 20.78 (9.79)
Math teacher education
BA or equivalent 0 (0) .09 (.29) .05 (.22) 0 (0) .81 (.39) .93 (.25) .45 (.50)
MA/Ph.D. .99 (.11) .02 (.15) 0 (0) .99 (.08) .16 (.36) .02 (.14) .00 (.07)
Science teacher characteristics
Teacher is female .77 (.42) .78 (.42) .82 (.38) .66 (.47) .85 (.36) .83 (.38) .77 (.42)
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Table A3 (continued )
CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM
Teacher’s exp. bef.
trans
21.12 (11.75) 18.56 (9.70) 16.57 (8.03) 18.88 (10.64) 19.54 (11.06) 18.00 (11.34) 20.01 (10.22)
Science teacher education
BA or equivalent 0 (0) .21 (.41) .14 (.34) 0 (0) .72 (.45) .88 (.32) .54 (.50)
MA/Ph.D. .96 (.19) .01 (.08) 0 (0) 1 (0) .22 (.42) .03 (.16) .01 (.08)
Institutional setting
School responsibilities
Autonomy (budget,
supplies, teachers)
2.59 (.66) 2.92 (.30) 2.98 (.13) 2.40 (.80) 2.79 (.44) 2.85 (.39) 1.51 (.86)
Determining teacher
salary
.59 (.49) .88 (.33) .29 (.45) .85 (.36) .15 (.36) .75 (.44) .07 (.25)
Strong influence on curriculum
Teachers individually .83 (.37) .79 (.41) .24 (.42) .16 (.37) .50 (.50) .44 (.50) .08 (.27)
Teachers collectively .66 (.47) .54 (.50) .15 (.36) .10 (.30) .24 (.43) .56 (.50) .04 (.20)
Math class teacher has strong influence on
Money for supplies or
subject matter
.13 (.33) .77 (.42) .12 (.33) .19 (.39) .04 (.20) .12 (.33) .17 (.37)
Kind of supplies or
textbooks
.42 (.49) .22 (.41) .34 (.47) .16 (.37) .07 (.26) .23 (.42) .18 (.38)
Science teacher has strong influence on
Money for supplies or
subject matter
.16 (.37) .71 (.46) .17 (.38) .27 (.44) .14 (.35) .26 (.44) .21 (.40)
Kind of supplies or
textbooks
.50 (.50) .29 (.45) .50 (.50) .22 (.41) .13 (.34) .26 (.44) .17 (.37)
Additional math
Homework .58 (.43) 1.36 (.51) 1.89 (.93) 1.18 (.71) 2.06 (.90) 1.87 (.74) 4.52 (1.83)
Uninterested parents
limit teaching
.07 (.26) .08 (.27) .18 (.38) .11 (.31) .09 (.28) .17 (.38) .50 (.50)
Additional science
Homework .16 (.18) .77 (.65) .28 (.25) .27 (.20) .63 (.58) .59 (.53) .76 (.95)
Uninterested parents
limit teaching
.06 (.23) .10 (.30) .17 (.38) .08 (.28) .06 (.24) .09 (.28) .37 (.48)
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Values are weighted by the sampling probability of the students.
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